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Abstract 
Previous research has begun to investigate how small groups make decisions when facing risky 
choices. However, no consensus has been reached. One stream of research found that groups are 
more risk averse, while another one reported the contrary and some studies did not even find 
any significant difference. This paper is meant to provide a clear comparison between two 
different experimental designs from Harrison et al. (2012) and Zhang and Casari, (2012). The 
former tests the risk preferences of groups of three members where group’s decision is taken 
with the majority rule; the latter, also tests risk preferences of three-members group, but using a 
different lottery set and aggregation rule, i.e. unanimity. These two experiments lead to different 
results: Harrison et al. (2012) did not find any substantial difference between individuals’ and 
groups’ preferences over risk, while Zhang and Casari (2012) found that groups tend to be more 
prone to the risk neutrality than individuals. Additionally, we present a replication study of 
Harrison et al. (2012) and Zhang and Casari (2012) in order to check to what extent the lottery 
set and the aggregation rule (majority or unanimity) adopted to elicit preferences may affect the 
final group choice. It results that individual and group choices are not significantly different, 
regardless of the lottery set and the aggregation rule used in the experimental design.  
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1. Introduction 
What have in common a company managed by a board of directors, an important 
purchase planned by the whole family and political parties’ deliberations? They are all 
decisions taken by groups. Indeed, in the real life groups, rather than individuals, make 
most choices. However, for a long time economists have been studying only individual 
decision-making. Nevertheless, in-group interaction may have an impact on the final 
outcome. Is the final result just a sum of individual preferences or group interaction 
affects it? And if so, in which direction the outcome changes?  
A growing number of laboratory experiments have tested how groups reach 
agreement in risky choices (Ambrus et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2008; Charness et al., 
2006; Holt and Laury, 2002; Masclet et al., 2009; Shupp and Williams, 2008; 
Rockenbach et al., 2001). In particular, we consider two studies as illustrative in this 
field: Harrison et al. (2012), and Zhang and Casari (2012). The former tests risk 
preferences of groups of three members, where group’s decision is taken with the 
majority rule (MR); the latter, also tests risk preferences of three-members group, but 
using a different aggregation rule, i.e. unanimity rule (UR). These two experiments lead 
to different results3: Harrison et al. (2012) did not find any statistical difference between 
individuals’ and groups’ preferences over risk, while Zhang and Casari (2012) found 
that groups tend to be more prone to the risk neutrality than individuals. What trigger 
these different results? 
The work here presented is a replication study aimed to investigate the link 
between individual and group preferences towards risk. To do this, we picked lottery 
sets and aggregation rules from both Harrison et al. (2012) and Zhang and Casari 
(2012), we crossed them, in order to bring out whether there is a factor of the 
experimental design affecting the final group decision.  
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. We first examine the most 
relevant papers from previous literature, in order to outline an overview of the main 
results reached in this field. In the third section we discuss and presents the replication 
experimental design and its implementation. Finally, we report our results and 
conclusions.  																																																								3	Zhang and Casari (2012) and Harrison et al. (2012) differs also for the lottery set used to elicit group 
and individual preferences towards risk.	
	 3 
2. Literature Review 
In the last decade, several experiments investigated groups’ risk attitudes. However, 
they did not achieve a univocal position. Some of them reported that groups are more 
risk adverse than individuals (Ambrus et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2008; Bateman and 
Munro, 2005; Shupp and Williams, 2008; Masclet et al., 2009). Conversely, other 
studies show that groups tend to be less risk adverse (Rockenbach et al., 2001; Zhang 
and Casari, 2012). Others do not even report significant differences (Harrison et al., 
2012). It can be argued that depending on the study, results go in different directions. 
These studies differ in terms of methods for eliciting risk preferences (e.g. bids, 
auctions, pairwise choice, etc.), interaction rules (that is, group members are allowed or 
not to talk), aggregation rules for collect group risk choices (e.g. majority-voting, 
unanimity, etc.), and even number of members per group.  
We will now focus on two illustrative works: Harrison et al. (2012), and Zhang 
and Casari (2012). Both the studies value the risk attitude of individuals and three-
members groups, using a pairwise choice mechanism inspired at Holt and Laury (2002). 
Nevertheless, their experimental designs differ as well as their findings.  
Harrison et al. (2012) test participants in a within-subjects design experiment with 
2 treatments: individual and group. In both the treatments, subjects face ten binary 
choices (Table 1). In each problem, subjects choose which lottery to play between one 
“safe” (A) and one “risky” option (B). 
 
TABLE 1 - Payoff Table for Harrison’s Experiment 
 
         Source: Harrison et al. (2012), p. 29 
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To every pairwise choice corresponds an interval of CRRA (Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion), which denotes the degree of risk aversion. Risk neutrality involves that 
a subject switches from A to B when EVB is greater than EVA. The “switching” point is 
used to infer individual and group risk attitudes. Therefore, when the CRRA coefficient 
is greater than 0, the subject is considered risk-averse, while when the CRRA 
coefficient less than 0, the subject is risk-lover. In this case, the “switching point” lies 
within the fourth and the fifth lines (Table 2).  
They conduct the experiment over 108 university students, divided into 36 groups. 
Subjects perform two tasks – iRA and gRA – aimed at eliciting individuals’ and groups’ 
degree of risk aversion respectively. The tasks were structured as follows: iRA/gRA, 
and gRA/iRA.  
Using extensions of traditional Tobit model, Harrison and colleagues (2012) 
found that individual and group risk aversion values were very close: the average 
CRRA coefficient is 0.57 for individual and 0.59 for groups. Thus, from the comparison 
between individual and group risk attitude, no significant differences emerged (Figure 
1). 
 
 
FIGURE 1 - Fraction of People Chose Safe Option A: Individual vs. Group  
         Source: Harrison et al. (2012), p. 37 
 
In their experiment, Zhang and Casari (2012) used 15 binary lottery choices. 
Lottery A offered constantly 50 tokens, while lottery B presented two payoffs (0 and 
150) with changing probabilities (Table 2). A perfect risk-neutral subject should switch 
from A to B in lottery 8. Hence, those who switch earlier are risk-loving, while those 
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who will switch afterwards are risk-averse.  
 
TABLE 2 - Prospect of Lotteries in Experimental Design  
Implemented by Zhang and Casari (2012) 
 
               Source: Zhang and Casari (2012) 
 
They tested 120 individuals and 40 groups who faced the same set of lotteries. In 
the first part, participants play the game individually, while in the second part, they 
were randomly divided into three-members groups. At the beginning of the group task, 
each member submits his/her proposal about the lottery to choose. If proposals are 
different, a chat box opens and members have 2 minutes to discuss via chat. Finally, 
they have to submit again their choices. 
They have 3 attempts to reach unanimity; otherwise the default rule is applied. 
The default rule involved “no choice and zero earnings” for that group: that is, without 
unanimity the group lost every chance to win a positive amount of tokens. Following 
the same procedure in Harrison et al. (2012) to infer risk attitudes, Zhang and Casari 
(2012) also report intervals of CRRA for every decision problem (Table 3). 
Comparison showed that the most number of switches occurred in lotteries 8-15. 
In contrast with Harrison et al. (2012), it emerged that groups were closer to risk 
neutrality than individuals (+4.3%), showing a so-called “risky shift” (Figure 2).  
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TABLE 3 - Intervals of CRRA when Subjects Switch from A to B  
and Frequencies of Choices for B 
 
   Source: Zhang and Casari (2012) 
 
 
FIGURE 2 - Fractions of Individuals and Groups Choices. 
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        Source: Zhang and Casari (2012) 
 
According to Zhang and Casari (2012), along with the in-group interaction, the 
default rule of “zero earnings” must have caused the “risky shift”. The  “pressure” due 
to this rule might push even the most risk-averse subjects to endorse a riskier position 
just to have a positive monetary return. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedure 
In order to really compare these two experiments with different designs and results, and 
to disentangle which factor has the most influence of group choice, we replicate and 
merge the works by Harrison et al. (2012) and Zhang and Casari (2012) into a 
replication experiment.  
The experiment was conducted on a heterogeneous sample of 300 students from 
Universitat Jaume I. The experiment is a 2x2 (lottery sets and aggregation rules) within-
subjects design. Participants are involved in two treatments: individual and group. Each 
treatment has two sequential tasks: one with the 10 binary lottery choices by Harrison et 
al. (2012) and the one with the 15 binary lottery choices by Zhang and Casari (2012).  
Firstly, subjects played individually. Participants were presented with the two 
tasks, not always in the same order. Payoffs were all converted in € (Figure 3). We 
showed all the 25 pairs of lotteries one by one, while participants took note of which 
one they preferred to play on a sheet we provided in advance (refer to Appendix for all 
the lotteries). 
 
 
FIGURE 3 - Example of Lotteries Presented	
 
After collecting answers subject by subject, we merged them using the majority 
rule in order to bring out which would be the group result when this rule is applied for 
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every group.  
In the second part, we randomly formed groups of three people (100 groups). 
Groups faced the same task of the first part. In the group session, we called for 
unanimity for each lottery. Group members could communicate face-to-face with no 
time limits. Once they agreed the passed to the next decisional problems. Finally, one 
lottery out of 25 was randomly picked and played for real. 
Overall, we run the experiment in 10 occasions. No person took part in the 
experiment in more than one occasion. The whole session (individual and group 
treatments) took on average 40 minutes.  
 
4. Analysis and Results  
We first examine results obtained when people make a decision on the 10-lotteries set 
(Harrison et al., 2012), both individually and then in group. The graph below (Figure 4) 
reports the percentage of choices for A (the safe option). It compares individual choices 
(circle line), group choices elicited with majority rule (triangle line) and those given by 
members as unanimous decision after discussion (square line). As mentioned earlier, in 
the lottery prospect used by Harrison et al. (2012) a perfect risk-neutral subject (cross 
line) should switch from A to B at the 5th decision problem. A switch in later decisions 
reveals risk aversion, while a switch in earlier decisions reveals risk-seeking behavior.  
 
 
FIGURE 4 - Fraction of Individuals and Groups’ who Chose A  
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in Harrison’s Pairwise Choices 
 
As we can notice from the graph above, individuals seem to be distant from the 
risk neutrality. Individuals are less risk averse than groups till the 5th decision problem. 
Note that, as the probability of obtaining the highest payoff increases, they appeared a 
little bit more risk averse. The switching point occurs at lottery 3. Indeed, the number of 
individuals’ safer choices dramatically decreases from the 3rd to the 4th question: 
percentage of people who chose A passes from 84,7% in the former problem to 55% in 
the latter. This percentage gradually lowers between the 4th and the 8th decisional 
problems, while it is almost null in the last two. Also for the groups, the switching point 
occurs at lottery number 3 with both majority and unanimity rule.  
In order to infer risk aversion of subjects and groups, we calculated midpoints of 
CRRA coefficient for each lottery. It is useful to clarify that a rational subject with 
monotonic preferences should switch from the safer to the riskier option just once and 
never switch back. Instead, some subjects (and groups) switched from A to B and vice 
versa more than once, showing such a kind of inconsistency or indifference over a 
certain range. This behavior can be due to a couple of reasons: either subjects (or 
groups) are genuinely or they are irrational (do not respect monotonicity) or it is just a 
mistake. For our purpose, we consider this behavior a “mistake” when only one 
switchback occurred. In these cases, we fixed the error and included that subject (or 
group) into the computation, since the real intention was clear. On the contrary, we 
labeled as “irrational” those participants who showed multiple switches and we did not 
considered them in the calculation, because their intentions were not so clear4.  
The average CRRA coefficient confirmed the results of the analysis. For the 
subjects, we found an average CRRA coefficient of −0.37, while it amounts to −0.40 for 
MR and UR choices5. These values highlight that all the choices are quite less risk 
averse than a risk neutral subject, but they are all close to each other. Indeed, individual 
and group risk aversion is not statistically different. The two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on the individuals’ and groups’ distributions of switching points retains the 
null hypothesis of equality6.  																																																								
4 On this procedure, see “Inconsistent Choices in Lottery Experiments: Evidence from Rwanda”, by S. 
Jacobson and R. Petrie, 2007 
5 For this evaluation, we took into account 276 individuals, 94 MR-groups and 95 UR-groups. 
6 Individual distribution is not statistically different from MR-groups (n=300, m=100, p>.05) and from 
UR-groups (p>.05) when using the lottery set from Harrison et al. (2012). 
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Let us pass to analyze the results when using the 15 binary lotteries from Zhang 
and Casari (2012). As we can notice from Figure 5, the line of individuals’, MR and UR 
choices approximately retrace the same path.  
 
 
FIGURE 5 - Fraction of Individuals and Groups’ who Chose A  
in Zhang and Casari’s Pairwise Choices 
 
This phenomenon seems to confirm the conclusions drawn by Harrison et al. (2012), 
with a different lottery prospect. The graph above suggests that individuals, MR and UR 
choices are almost all slightly more risk-averse than a perfect risk-neutral subject. 
Indeed, the switching point occurs a bit later (between the 8th and the 9th line rather than 
at 8th one). In lotteries 1-6 risk-seeking behavior is rare. Some differences come from 
lotteries 6-9 where UR choices seem to be a little more risk-averse than individuals and 
MR choices.  
However, as in the first task, these trends are not statistically different. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on switching point distributions between individuals and 
groups retains the null hypothesis of equality7.  
The calculation of the coefficient of CRRA supports these findings. The average 
CRRA coefficient for individuals is -0.40, close to MR groups one (-0.39) and UR 
																																																								
7 Individual distribution is not statistically different from MR-groups (n=300, m=100, p>.05) and from 
UR-groups (p>.05) when using the lottery set from Zhang-Casari (2012). 	
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groups (-0.38)8. Actually, the most part of individuals (64,3%) switched between at the 
8th pair of lotteries, as the MR groups almost did the same (69%), and UR groups 
(71%). 
Overall, the effects of aggregation rule and lottery set display the same pattern in 
both the tasks9.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this research, we first replicated Harrison et al. (2012), and Zhang and Casari (2012) 
on a new sample. Then, we tested whether and to what extant different lottery sets and 
aggregation rules have an impact on group choices. In line with Harrison et al. (2012), 
our results confirm that no significant differences occur between individuals and group 
risk aversion, regardless of the aggregation rule used to elicit the group choices. 
However, these results are in contrast with Zhang and Casari (2012), who found that 
group choices are more risky than individual choices. Since the “risk-shift” is not due to 
the lottery set, neither to the aggregation rule, indeed we can conclude that it is driven 
by the “zero earnings” default rule to resolve disagreement. Indeed, the “zero earnings” 
default rule impulses people to find an agreement, and to make a choice even though it 
is riskier, because a risky choice is better than no choice. Instead, in our experiment, 
group members have no time limits to discuss and find a unanimous choice.  
All in all we can conclude that there are no differences in individuals and groups 
decisions toward risk. 
																																																								
8 For this calculation we consider 285 individuals, 100 MR-groups and 94 UR-groups. 
9 With the lottery set from Harrison et al. (2012), on average 40% of individual choices were safe, with 
respect to 40,5% of MR-groups and 40,4% of UR-groups. With the lottery set from Zhang-Casari (2012), 
on average 75,6% of individual choices were safe choices, with respect to 74,4% of MR-groups and 76% 
of UR-groups. 
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Appendix  
 
TABLE 1 - First set of Lotteries in the Experiment (Harrison et. al., 2012) 
 
Lottery A Lottery B 
50 ECU 40 ECU 96,25 ECU 2.50 ECU 
10% 90% 10% 90% 
20% 80% 20% 80% 
30% 70% 30% 70% 
40% 60% 40% 60% 
50% 50% 50% 50% 
60% 40% 60% 40% 
70% 30% 70% 30% 
80% 20% 80% 20% 
90% 10% 90% 10% 
100% 0% 100% 0% 
 
 
TABLE 2 - Second Set of Lotteries in the Experiment (Zhang and Casari., 2012) 
 
Lottery A Lottery B 
50 ECU 150 ECU 0 ECU 
100% 5% 95% 
100% 10% 90% 
100% 15% 85% 
100% 20% 80% 
100% 25% 75% 
100% 30% 70% 
100% 35% 65% 
100% 40% 60% 
100% 45% 55% 
100% 50% 50% 
100% 55% 45% 
100% 60% 40% 
100% 65% 35% 
100% 70% 30% 
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